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Abstract: Pay What You Want (PWYW) pricing has received considerable attention recently. 
Empirical studies show that a PWYW pricing mechanism is able to increase a seller’s turnover and 
profit. This paper addresses PWYW pricing for bundles of experience goods. The paper shows that a 
PWYW pricing mechanism, if applied ex post consumption, separates the decision to buy from the 
decision how much to pay. Information asymmetries about the quality of the good are reduced during 
the act of consumption so that buyers are informed about the product’s quality when they decide how 
much to pay. As a consequence, risk-averse buyers who would otherwise refrain from purchasing 
under a fixed price mechanism, can be attracted to purchase under a PWYW pricing ex post 
consumption (PWYW-EPC) mechanism. In this case, the pricing mechanism itself constitutes a signal. 
The paper concludes that a PWYW pricing mechanism, applied ex post consumption, can be a 
profitable strategy for a seller if she sells bundles of experience goods and if she wants to attract risk-
averse buyers for realizing economies of scale in production. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Pay What You Want (PWYW) pricing is a participative pricing mechanism. On the one hand, 
it gives a buyer1
For an experience good, a buyer faces information asymmetries concerning its quality 
ex ante the decision to buy. If the quality of a good can only be observed after consumption, a 
buyer is at risk of falling victim by paying an inadequately high price. In extreme cases of 
information asymmetries market failure in the form of adverse selection may occur (Akerlof 
1970). As a consequence of information asymmetries, only risk-loving buyers remain on the 
market. In other words, a buyer who is willing to pay for a good but who is risk-averse 
abstains from the purchase because the seller may exploit information asymmetries (Farrell 
1986). Many signaling strategies to overcoming problems of ex ante opportunism in a 
purchase are discussed in the literature, such as warranties, certificates, brand image, prices, 
among others (cf. Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Lutz 1989; Kirmani and Rao 2000). In this 
paper we add another institution, namely a pricing mechanism to this list. 
 the option to determine the price of a good. In contrast to other participative 
pricing mechanisms, such as reverse auctions, PWYW pricing allows a buyer to do monetary 
harm to a seller by paying nothing. On the other hand, a seller may apply a PWYW pricing 
mechanism as a marketing strategy, which brings a new product to the attention of potential 
buyers, or which can increase the demand for a good. In some cases PWYW pricing has also 
led to an increase in revenues and profits in contrast to traditional pricing mechanisms. 
We address the question why PWYW pricing may yield positive effects for a seller. 
Our argument is that in contrast to a fixed price mechanism, where the decision to buy and the 
decision to pay are in most cases ex ante consumption, in a specific PWYW pricing 
mechanism the decision to buy is ex ante consumption and the decision to pay is ex post 
consumption. Thus, between the two decisions buyers can consume the good and are allowed 
to reduce information asymmetries with respect to the quality of the good. We term this 
specific type of a PWYW pricing mechanism ‘PWYW pricing ex post consumption’ 
(PWYW-EPC). 
Implementing such a pricing mechanism can turn out to be a successful strategy for 
sellers of experience goods, which are often sold as a bundle. For bundles, a PWYW pricing 
mechanism can result in higher turnover rates – compared to bundles sold at fixed prices –                                                         
1 In the PWYW literature the terms buyer and seller are commonly used. We follow this terminology 
and consider customers and producers as suitable synonyms. The same applies to the term good that is 
used as a synonym for product and includes in its general meaning storable and non-storable goods as 
well as rights. 
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and PWYW can be a feasible pricing strategy for a seller who wants to attract risk-averse 
buyers. Furthermore, with respect to bundles of experience goods, a PWYW pricing 
mechanisms can be used to realize economies of scale. By drawing the attention to the pricing 
mechanism, we expand the extensive literature on pricing strategies for experience goods 
(Shapiro 1983). 
We regard this argumentation and its consequence as important for sellers who are 
considering the implementation of a PWYW pricing mechanism for experience goods. With 
the non-formal model provided in the paper we go beyond the existing description of case 
studies and experimental research in the fast growing literature on PWYW pricing. The 
economic idea provided in this paper can be seen as complementary to other studies of 
PWYW pricing which mostly focus on buyers’ social preferences, reference prices, or 
psychological effects of consumption.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on PWYW 
pricing. The focus is on the characteristics of the goods sold via a PWYW pricing mechanism. 
In Section 3 we argue that the best way to analyze the effect of asymmetric information is to 
consider it as a bundle (or a good with different characteristics). This allows us to analyze the 
ways in which sellers can manipulate the bundle’s components in order to increase the 
success of a PWYW pricing mechanism. In Section 4 we use the insights gained in the 
previous section to derive propositions about the advantages and disadvantages of PWYW-
EPC. Finally, Section 5 draws conclusions. 
 
 
2. Goods that are sold via PWYW 
 
In this section we point out that goods sold via PWYW are often similar to experience goods 
and that these goods are often sold in bundles. Hence, we deal with bundled experience 
goods. Information asymmetries with respect to the quality of these bundles are generally 
high (Park and Seo 2008). 
The goods sold via PWYW pricing may include movie tickets, hot beverages at a 
delicatessen (Kim, Natter, and Spann 2009; 2010a), restaurant meals (Kim, Natter, and Spann 
2010b; Riener and Traxler 2012), souvenir photos (Gneezy et al. 2010), holiday packages 
(León, Noguera, and Tena-Sánchez 2012) and music downloads (Regner and Barria 2009; 
Regner 2010; Regner and Riener 2012). Most of these goods share an important characteristic 
of experience goods: for buyers, the quality of the good is unknown ex ante consumption (cf. 
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Nelson 1970) but can be verified after consumption. Music downloads are an exception 
because buyers have pre-purchasing access to the music (Regner and Barria 2009: 396). 
Information asymmetries related to costs are addressed by Greiff, Egbert, and 
Xhangolli (2013). However, they do not discuss information asymmetries as regards the 
quality of the good. The same applies to the majority of the literature, which does not address 
the role of a PWYW pricing mechanism as a signaling strategy to overcome information 
asymmetries. In this relation we elaborate on the determinants of the utility that a buyer has 
when consuming a good bought from a seller who employs a PWYW pricing strategy. To 
some extent we follow Thaler (1985: 204-205) who distinguishes between “acquisition 
utility” and “transaction utility” but we transfer these concepts to the context of PWYW 
pricing mechanisms. 
In a typical PWYW transaction the buyer derives utility from three sources: First, 
from the consumption of a good of a specific quality, second, from the atmosphere in which 
purchase and consumption take place, and, third, from the image associated with buying the 
good at a specific price. Hence, when a buyer decides to purchase a bundle, these three 
aspects play a role. The first and the second concept correspond to Thaler’s “aquisition 
utility”, and the third concept can be related to what Thaler calls “transaction utility” (Thaler 
1985: 204-205). Next we discuss these three concepts in the context of a PWYW pricing 
mechanism. 
First, a buyer derives utility from the consumption of the good, e.g., the consumption 
of a meal or watching a movie. The utility from consumption depends on the quality of the 
good. Assuming non-saturation with respect to quality, utility increases with the quality of the 
good. 
Second, as purchase and consumption do not happen in isolation, the “atmosphere” 
(Kotler 1973) in which purchase and consumption take place influences the buyer’s utility. 
Here, we distinguish between the atmosphere in the buying process and the atmosphere in the 
consumption process. The atmosphere in the buying process includes store environment, sales 
personnel friendliness and assistance. The seller controls the atmosphere in the buying 
process. This holds for all goods, storable and non-storable alike. 
However, differences exist with respect to the person who can influence the 
atmosphere in the consumption process. For storable goods, the atmosphere of consumption 
can only be partially influenced by a seller but not often. For instance, a souvenir photo that is 
purchased or a song that is downloaded can be consumed at any place. For non-storable 
goods, a seller has more and a buyer has less control over the atmosphere in which 
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consumption takes place. For example, a meal has to be consumed at a restaurant and the 
purchase of a movie ticket has a fixed time and venue. For some non-storable goods, the 
atmosphere of consumption is not completely determined by the seller but can be partly 
chosen by the buyer. An example is a cup of coffee or a burger, which can be consumed in a 
shop or at a later point of time. It is important to note that the atmosphere in which purchase 
and consumption take place can be an element in a buyer’s utility function. Thus a seller can – 
at least partly – control a buyer’s utility derived from the atmosphere. 
Third, there are buyers who follow image motivations. In this case a buyer derives 
utility from non-material aspects related to consumption of a good, such as social status. The 
existence of non-material incentives is not new (Becker 1957, 1974; Geanakoplos, Pearce, 
and Stacchetti 1989), but has recently received considerable attention in the behavioral 
economics literature. Of particular importance for our argument are self image concerns and 
social image concerns (e.g., Andreoni 1990; Andreoni and Bernheim 2009; Ariely, Bracha, 
and Meier 2009). In the PWYW literature, these motivations are commonly used to explain 
why a buyer pays something at all even if she could pay nothing (e.g., Gneezy et al. 2010; 
Gneezy et al. 2012; Regner and Riener 2012). We argue that a seller can partly control the 
decision to buy and the decision how much to pay through the influence of these non-material 
incentives.2
It is worth noting that such image motivations are also relevant in traditional pricing. 
However, with traditional pricing, image motivations only affect the decision whether to buy 
or not, but under a PWYW pricing mechanism, image motivations can affect both, the 
decision whether to buy or not and the decision how much to pay. Hence, we conjecture that 
compared to a fixed price mechanism image motivations are more salient in a PWYW pricing 
mechanism.
 
3
 
 Nevertheless, since image motivations are not directly related to information 
asymmetries, which are the focus of this paper, we refrain from a more detailed discussion on 
image motivations. In the following section we discuss how the first and second concepts – 
quality and atmosphere – relate to information asymmetries. 
                                                         
2 This relates to the marketing literature on store images and brand images. 
3 Besides the choice of the payment mechanism, anonymity and social distance affect the salience of 
image motivations. The degree of anonymity is likely to matter because with lower anonymity, social 
distance will be reduced and fairness considerations will be more salient. For the influence of social 
distance see, e.g. Hoffman et al. (1994; 1996) and Charness and Gneezy (2008). Regner and Riener 
(2012) provide evidence that social pressure has a positive effect on prices. Evidence for self image 
concerns can be found in Jang and Chu (2012, experiments 2b, 3 and 4) and Gneezy et al. (2012). 
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3. Information Asymmetries in Traditional and PWYW Pricing  
 
In the previous section we outlined that goods sold via a PWYW pricing mechanism share 
important characteristics of experience goods. For such goods, information asymmetries are 
high because buyers have only limited information about the quality of the good before 
consumption. It follows that risk-averse buyers refrain from making the purchase. However, 
this is not what we observe in a real-world context because there are different ways of 
reducing information asymmetries through a signaling mechanism.  
Convincing buyers of the quality of a good is a signaling problem (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1986; Kirmani and Rao 2000). Sellers can employ different signals (e.g., price, 
advertising expenditure, brand name, warranty, spending on corporate social responsibility4
In a fixed price mechanism, trust between seller and buyer can only be established 
after the buyer has bought and consumed the good because the quality of the good cannot be 
observed ex ante. Indeed, repeated purchases are a feasible mechanism for solving the 
problem of asymmetric information if goods are homogenous, like a bar of chocolate. Buyers 
will make repeated purchases with the same seller if they are satisfied with the quality of the 
good. However, for goods that are bought infrequently or are heterogeneous, repeated 
purchases are not a solution to the problem of asymmetric information. Especially for 
heterogeneous goods, which are sold in bundles, such as meals and holiday packages, it is 
important to build trust before the decision to buy. If a seller uses a PWYW pricing 
mechanism, she signals the willingness to build trust because she risks making a loss if the 
buyer is not satisfied with the good and thus pays a comparatively low price. 
) 
to reveal information about the quality of the good in order to attract potential buyers. While 
with traditional pricing the price set by sellers can be a signal for the quality of the good, 
within a PWYW pricing mechanism this is not possible. However, the choice of the pricing 
mechanism is a signal in itself. 
Furthermore, by implementing a PWYW-EPC mechanism, the buyer’s decision 
whether to buy or not is separated from the decision how much to pay. In a fixed price 
mechanism, the decision of a buyer is a binary decision: to buy or not to buy the good at the 
specified price. Since the buyer cannot influence the price, the decision to buy automatically 
determines the buyer’s payment. Within a PWYW pricing mechanism, a buyer makes two 
decisions: First, there is the decision to buy, and second, there is the decision how much to                                                         
4 Empirical data shows that sellers of experience goods and credence goods are more likely to spend 
money on corporate social responsibility than sellers of search goods (Siegel and Votaliano 2007). 
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pay. This is outlined in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Models of Fixed Price Mechanism and PWYW-EPC 
 
 
The separation of the decision whether to buy or not from the decision on how much 
to pay has implications with respect to the problems resulting from information asymmetries. 
When making their first decision – the decision to buy – buyers do not have to fix an exact 
price. This reduces the risk for the buyer of falling victim to asymmetric information and 
paying a high price for a low quality product. During consumption, buyers learn about the 
quality of the good, and, since payments are made only after consumption, buyers can make 
their payments contingent on the quality of the good. The risk of suffering from moral hazard, 
i.e., opportunistic behavior of the seller, is greatly reduced because the information 
asymmetry declines during consumption. As a consequence, risk-averse buyers who are not 
willing to buy the good if they were to pay before consumption are now willing to buy the 
good.5
Assuming that buyers are fair in the sense that the average price is not too far below 
the price that the seller would charge with traditional pricing, sellers’ revenues will increase. 
Those sellers who operate under economies of scale benefit from the increased number of 
buyers attracted by PWYW-EPC. Economies of scale exist when capacity is underutilized 
 
                                                        
5 However, the risk of falling victim to moral hazard is then on the side of the seller, who may suffer 
from ex post consumption non-payment on the side of the buyer. 
8  
(e.g., a restaurant operating below capacity), for digital goods, or more generally, when fixed 
costs are high and marginal costs are not increasing. 
Another way to increase a seller’s revenue is to influence the atmosphere in which 
purchase and consumption take place. Two effects can be expected. First, the atmosphere 
provides informational cues and, hence, influences buyers’ expectations about the quality of 
the good (Baker, Grewal, and Parasuraman 1994: 329). Second, the atmosphere influences 
consumers’ affective state (Kotler 1973: 54). The first point holds for both traditional pricing 
and PWYW pricing. The second, however, is of importance in a PWYW-EPC mechanism. 
Here, it is possible that the atmosphere affects buyers’ moods, which in turn influences the 
price that buyers are willing to pay. 
If the act of consumption increases a buyer’s utility she may be willing to pay a higher 
price ex post consumption as compared to ex ante consumption.6
The above mentioned empirical studies suggest that under a PWYW pricing 
mechanism, the atmosphere in which the good is purchased and the atmosphere in which 
consumption takes place affects buyers’ moods, which in turn influences buyers’ willingness 
to pay. However, the exact relationship between moods and prices paid under a PWYW 
pricing mechanism remain a subject for further research. 
 The question for sellers is: 
Does the atmosphere affect buyers’ moods, and how do buyers’ moods affect prices that 
buyers pay? Answers are offered in Capra (2004), Kirchsteiger, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2006) 
and Riener and Traxler (2012). Capra (2004) finds that in dictator games, altruistic behavior is 
stronger if participants are in a positive mood. In a gift-exchange game, Kirchsteiger, Rigotti, 
and Rustichini  (2006) find that positive moods are correlated with more generosity but less 
reciprocity. From these two experiments it becomes clear that mood influences behavior, but 
it is not clear, how exactly mood is related to prices paid under a PWYW pricing mechanism. 
In their field study on PWYW pricing at a restaurant, Riener and Traxler (2012) use sunshine 
as a proxy for induced moods and analyze the effect of mood on prices. They find that in the 
summer, more sunshine leads to lower prices but in the autumn, more sunshine leads to higher 
prices. 
 
 
                                                         
6 We think that an optimal time span exists between consumption and ex post payment. This time span 
may be specific for every bundle. A too long time span between consumption and PWYW may yield 
negative effects on the willingness to pay. However, in this paper we do not tackle the optimal time 
span. 
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4. Recommendations for Sellers of Experience Goods 
 
In this section we outline under what conditions it seems recommendable for a seller to 
implement a PWYW-EPC mechanism. In order to do so, we distinguish two channels. The 
first channel is the possibility to realize economies of scale by implementing a PWYW 
pricing system. The second channel depends on the possibility of a seller to influence the 
utility a buyer derives during the act of consumption. While the first channel may be 
applicable to different type of goods, the second channel is especially relevant for bundles of 
experience goods. 
The first channel assumes that risk-averse buyers refrain from buying a good if the 
good’s quality is unknown and a fixed price mechanism is employed. Particularly, for 
heterogeneous experience goods, only risk-loving buyers will purchase. This is not 
problematic for a seller if her capacity utilization is high. However, if capacity utilization is 
low and economies of scale can be realized by attracting additional buyers, it makes sense for 
sellers to reduce the information asymmetry by signaling the quality of the good. While it 
may be costly to provide warranties or to offer quality certificates, it may be easy and cheap 
to use a pricing mechanism as a signal: a PWYW-EPC signals a buyer that the seller is 
convinced about the quality of the product and is even willing to take the risk of low payment. 
Indeed, sending such a signal may be the beginning of a relational contract initiated by the 
seller’s choice to implement a PWYW pricing mechanism. 
Risk-averse buyers are attracted because they are offered the option to reduce 
information asymmetries. This is achieved by separating the decision whether to buy or not 
from the decision how much to pay. Due to the possibility to reduce the information 
asymmetry before the decision how much to pay, additional consumers are attracted, even if a 
buyer’s willingness to pay is not affected by the choice of the PWYW pricing mechanism. 
Note firstly that this strategy does not need to increase profits but reduces average costs in 
case of scale effects in production, which are likely to be present if fixed costs are high and 
capacity utilization is low. Note secondly that the quality of the product does not have to be 
changed and no extra efforts on the seller’s side are needed, except the implementation of the 
pricing mechanism. 
The second channel relates to additional gains received from the effect of the PWYW 
pricing mechanism on the buyer’s willingness to pay. Using PWYW pricing and allowing the 
buyer to decide about the price she pays, pricing is unlikely to be perceived as unfair. Hence, 
the choice of the PWYW pricing mechanism affects the buyer’s fairness perceptions. If 
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fairness perceptions influence the buyer’s willingness to pay, then the choice of a PWYW 
pricing mechanism can increase prices paid (cf. Ashworth and McShane 2012: 146). 
Furthermore, the atmosphere of purchase respectively consumption affects the buyer’s mood 
and these may have a positive impact on the buyer’s willingness to pay. Although the 
relationship between the buyer’s mood and prices buyers pay under a PWYW pricing 
mechanism is not entirely clear, sellers should be aware that moods matter. This seems 
particularly important for non-storable goods. 
Besides positive effects a seller may derive from PWYW-EPC, she should be aware of 
possible problems. For instance, Léon et al. (2012: 398) speak of cannibalization effects in a 
PWYW-EPC payment. In their case, buyers have the possibility of spending money on related 
goods instead of spending money on the bundle of a tourist package itself. The low payment 
rate ex post consumption may be due to mental accounting and the fact that buyers have spent 
on complements to the tourist package thus leaving less money left for the bundle itself. 
Indeed, this is a case in which choosing the price ex post consumption is disadvantageous for 
the seller. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Pricing as a signal for product quality under information asymmetries is not a new topic. In 
this paper we contributed to it by arguing that the choice of the pricing mechanism is a signal, 
which has not been discussed in the literature. In particular, we focus on ‘PWYW ex post 
consumption’ (PWYW-EPC) pricing. Our argument is that this mechanism yields positive 
effects because it separates the decision whether to buy or not from the decision how much to 
pay. Thus, typical problems of information asymmetries, such as adverse selection and moral 
hazard, can be solved. Risk-averse buyers can be attracted and unexploited economies of 
scale can be realized. Additionally, sellers can also realize higher profits by influencing the 
atmosphere of purchase and consumption. Our arguments are related to bundles of experience 
goods, which show specific features and for which a PWYW pricing mechanism has been 
applied most often. 
 
 
 
 
 
11  
Acknowledgement 
For helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper we thank Pavlin Bonev, Christian 
Lumpe, and participants at workshops and lectures in Skopje and Sofia. We thank Julia Koch 
and Thomas Reuber for providing research assistance. All errors are ours. 
 
 
References 
 
Akerlof, G. (1970), The market for ‘lemons’: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488–500. 
Andreoni, J. (1990), Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow 
giving, Economic Journal, 100(401), 464–477. 
Andreoni, J.; Bernheim, B. (2009), Social image and the 50–50 norm: A theoretical and 
experimental analysis of audience effects, Econometrica 77(5), 1607–1636. 
Ariely, D.; Bracha, A.; Meier S. (2009), Doing good, doing good or doing well? Image 
motivation and monetary incentives in behaving prosocially, American Economic 
Review, 99(1), 544–555. 
Ashworth, L.; McShane, L. (2012), Why do we care what others pay? The effect of 
consumers’ prices on inferences of seller (dis)respect and perceptions of deservingness 
violation, Journal of Retailing, 88(1), 145–155. 
Baker, J.; Grewal, D.; Parasuraman, A. (1994), The influence of store environment on quality 
inferences and store Image, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 22(4), 328–
339. 
Becker, G. S. (1957), The Economics of Discrimination, Chicago University Press. 
Becker, G. S. (1974), A theory of social interactions, Journal of Political Economy, 82(6), 
1063–1093. 
Capra, M. (2004), Mood-driven behavior in strategic interactions, American Economic 
Review, 94(2), 367–372. 
Charness, G.; Gneezy, U. (2008), What’s in a name? Anonymity and social distance in 
dictator and ultimatum games, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68(1) 
29–35. 
Farrell, J. (1986), Moral hazard as an entry barrier, RAND Journal of Economics, 17(3), 440–
449. 
Geanakoplos, J.; Pearce, D.; Stacchetti, E. (1989), Psychological games and sequential 
rationality, Games and Economic Behavior, 1(1), 60–79. 
12  
Gneezy, A.; Gneezy, U.; Nelson, L. D.; Brown, A. (2010), Shared social responsibility: A 
field experiment in pay-what-you-want pricing and charitable giving, Science, 
329(5989), 325–327. 
Gneezy, A.; Gneezy, U.; Riener, G.; Nelson, L. D. (2012), Pay-what-you-want, identity, and 
self-signaling in markets, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(19), 
7236–7240. 
Greiff, M.; Egbert, H.; Xhangolli, K. (2013), Pay what you want – but pay enough, Munich 
Personal RePEc Archive, MPRA 52766. 
Hoffman, E.; McCabe, K. A.; Smith, V. L. (1996), On expectations and monetary stakes in 
ultimatum games, International Journal of Game Theory, 25(3), 289–301. 
Hoffman, E.; McCabe, K. A.; Shachat, K.; Smith, V. L. (1994), Preferences, property rights, 
and anonymity in bargaining games, Games and Economic Behavior, 7(3), 346–380. 
Jang, H.; Chu, W. (2012), Are consumers acting fairly toward companies? An examination of 
pay-what-you-want pricing, Journal of Macromarketing, 32(4), 348–360. 
Kim, J.-Y.; Natter, M.; Spann, M. (2009), Pay what you want: A new participative pricing 
mechanism, Journal of Marketing, 73(1), 44–58. 
Kim, J.-Y.; Natter, M.; Spann, M. (2010a), Pay-What-You-Want: Praxisrelevanz und 
Konsumentenverhalten, Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, 80(2), 147–169. 
Kim, J.-Y.; Natter, M.; Spann, M. (2010b), Kish: Where consumers pay as they wish, Review 
of Marketing Science, 8, article 3. 
Kirchsteiger, G.; Rigotti, L.; Rustichini, A. (2006), Your morals might be your moods, 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 59(2), 155–172. 
Kirmani, A.; Rao, A. R. (2000), No pain, no gain: A critical review of the literature on 
signaling unobservable product quality, Journal of Marketing, 64(2), 66–79. 
Kotler, P. (1973), Atmospherics as a marketing tool, Journal of Retailing, 49(4), 48–64. 
León, F. J.; Noguera, J. A.; Tena-Sánchez, J. (2012), How much would you like to pay? Trust, 
reciprocity and prosocial motivations in El trato, Social Science Information, 51(3), 
389–417. 
Lutz, N. A. (1989), Warranties as signals under consumer moral hazard, RAND Journal of 
Economics, 20(2), 239–255. 
Milgrom, P.; Roberts, J. (1986), Price and advertising signals of product quality, Journal of 
Political Economy, 94(4), 796–821. 
Park, J.; Seo, K. (2008), Bundling, information aggregation and entry deterrence, Economic 
Letters, 101(2), 100–102. 
Nelson, P. (1970), Information and consumer behavior, Journal of Political Economy, 78(2), 
13  
311–329.  
Riener, G.; Traxler, C. (2012), Norms, moods, and free lunch: Longitudinal evidence on 
payments from a pay-what-you-want restaurant, Journal of Socio-Economics, 41(4), 
476–483. 
Regner, T. (2010), Why consumers pay voluntarily: evidence from online music, Jena 
Economic Research Papers, No. 2010-081. 
Regner, T.; Barria, J. (2009), Do consumers pay voluntarily? The case of online music, 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71(2), 395–406. 
Regner, T.; Riener, G. (2012), Voluntary payments, privacy and social pressure on the 
internet: A natural field experiment, DICE Discussion Paper, No. 82. 
Shapiro, C. (1983), Optimal pricing of experience goods, Bell Journal of Economics, 14(2), 
497–507. 
Siegel, D.; Vitaliano, D. (2007), An empirical analysis of the strategic use of corporate social 
responsibility, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 16(3), 773–792. 
Thaler, R. (1985), Mental accounting and consumer choice, Marketing Science, 4(3), 199–
214. 
